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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Idaho Department of Fish and Game (“IDFG”) officers Josh Royse, Josh Stanley, Eric

Crawford, Tim Klucken, Brian Marek, Robert Howe, Andy Smith, David Silcock, and Doug
Petersen assisted the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) in executing federal search
warrants and consent searches in connection with an investigation into whether appellant
Michael Sparkes (“Sparkes”) was engaging in illegal outfitting and guiding in violation of Idaho
law and the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378. Various items of personal property discovered
during the searches were seized pursuant to the federal warrants. Sparkes sued IDFG, the abovenamed IDFG officers in their individual and official capacities, the Idaho Outfitters and Guides
Licensing Board (“Board”), and the Board’s Education and Enforcement Officer, Randal
Wadley, in his individual and official capacity, for damages Sparkes allegedly sustained as a
result of the searches and seizures. Sparkes’ Complaint asserted various state law tort claims and
federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. IDFG, the Board, and their officers in their individual
and official capacities sought summary judgment on all of Sparkes’ claims. The district court
granted the motion and subsequently entered a Judgment for Dismissal with Prejudice on all of
Sparkes’ claims. Sparkes, acting pro se, appealed to this Court.
B.

District Court Proceedings.
On April 10, 2015, Sparkes filed a Complaint against IDFG, the Board, and the IDFG

officers and Wadley in their individual and official capacities (collectively “the State”). (R. Vol.
1 pp. 20-32.) The Complaint asserted the following causes of action: (1) § 1983: malicious
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prosecution; (2) § 1983: malicious abuse of substantive and procedural due process; (3) § 1983:
failure to train and supervise; (4) § 1983: unlawful search and seizure; (5) intentional and/or
negligent infliction of emotional distress; (6) conversion; (7) “adverse tax consequences”; and
(8) tortious interference with economic expectation. Id.
On November 14, 2016, the State filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of
Sparkes’ claims, which was supported by a Memorandum, a Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts, and thirteen Declarations. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 119-20.) Sparkes filed an opposition based
largely upon conclusory allegations and alleged facts that were irrelevant to the claims actually
asserted in the Complaint. The opposition did not dispute that IDFG and the Board were entitled
to summary judgment on all of Sparkes’ § 1983 claims. (R. Vol. 5 p. 1028.) The opposition also
did not dispute that summary judgment should be granted to the individual officers on the § 1983
malicious prosecution, search and seizure, and failure to train/supervise claims. Id. The only
federal claim upon which Sparkes opposed summary judgment was the malicious abuse of
substantive and procedural due process claim. Id.
On December 29, 2016, the State filed its reply memorandum in support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment. Id. at p. 1027. That same day, Sparkes filed a Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint. Id. at 1011. The State filed an opposition to Sparkes’ Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint on January 3, 2017. Id.

At the summary judgment hearing, the district court

concluded that it would defer ruling on Sparkes’ Motion for Leave to Amend until a decision on
the State’s Motion for Summary Judgment was rendered. Id. at p. 1088.
On January 24, 2017, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on
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Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Decision”) granting the State summary judgment
on all of Sparkes’ claims. (R. Vol. 5 pp. 1085 & 1090.) The Decision was based upon the
court’s conclusions that (1): the federal claims against IDFG, the Board, and the officers in their
official capacities failed because those defendants were not “persons” subject to suit under §
1983; and (2) all of Sparkes’ claims against the officers in their individual capacities were barred
because Sparkes failed to timely post a bond as required by I.C. § 6-610. Id. at 1088-90.
Sparkes filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision on February 7, 2017. (R.
Vol. 5 p. 1126.) Sparkes argued the district court improperly relied upon I.C. § 6-610 as a basis
for dismissing the federal claims against the officers in their individual capacities. Id. at 1120.
Sparkes also contended there was a factual dispute as to whether his rights were violated because
he was not cited or charged with a crime. Id. at 1122. Sparkes did not dispute that the district
court properly granted summary judgment on all of Sparkes’ state law claims and on his federal
claims against IDFG, the Board, and their officers in their official capacities. Id. at 1120-24.
A hearing on Sparkes’ Motion for Reconsideration was held on March 24, 2017. (Tr.,
1/5/17, p. 1.) The district court denied Sparkes’ Motion for Reconsideration at the hearing and,
on March 31, 2017, also issued a written Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration. Id. p. 22
ll.12-13. The court acknowledged that I.C. § 6-610 did not bar the federal claims against the
officers in their individual capacities, but concluded summary judgment was nevertheless proper
on those claims because Sparkes failed to present any evidence that the officers engaged in
particular conduct that allegedly violated Sparkes’ rights. (Tr., 3/24/17, p. 20 l. 14 to p. 21 l. 13.)
A Judgment for Dismissal with Prejudice was issued and entered on March 31, 2017. (R.
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Vol. 5 p. 1137.) On May 10, 2017, Sparkes, acting pro se, filed a Notice of Appeal. Id. at 1139.
The Notice of Appeal contends the district court erred in at least thirteen different respects. Id. at
1139-44. However, the issues on appeal really boil down to whether the district court properly
granted summary judgment and denied Sparkes leave to amend his Complaint.
C.

Relevant Facts.
Sparkes leased approximately 20,000 acres of private property near Leadore, Idaho. (R.

Vol. 5 p. 976.) Sparkes used the property for hunting. Id. Sparkes began charging a “trespass
fee” for other people to hunt on the property. Id. at 976-77.
IDFG officers eventually became suspicious that Sparkes was guiding and/or outfitting
without a license. On August 19, 2011, IDFG Officer Ryan Hilton saw an online auction
advertising a deer hunt on 20,000 acres of private land south of Salmon, Idaho. (R. Vol. 4 p.
808.) The auction was for a “trespass fee” that would cover lodging and access to the property.
Id. The auction advertisement was posted by M2D Camo (Made 2 Deceive Camo), a camouflage
clothing company operated by Sparkes. (R. Vol. 5 p. 976.) The advertisement directed people to
the website of “Legendary Outfitters.” (R. Vol. 4 p. 808.) That website advertised hunting for a
“trespass fee” that covered lodging and access to private property to hunt. Id.
On October 6, 2011, Wadley sent Sparkes a letter advising Sparkes to stop advertising
guiding and outfitting in Idaho because he did not have the required license. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 46973.) The letter also explained how Sparkes could obtain the required license. Id. Sparkes
continued to sell “trespass hunts” on the Leadore property after he received the letter. (R. Vol. 4
p. 719.) Sparkes did not apply for or obtain a guide/outfitter license. (R. Vol. 2 p. 465.)
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Based on the foregoing, IDFG planned an investigation in which two officers would
covertly book trips through Sparkes for hunts on the leased property. (R. Vol. 1 p. 160 ll. 13-23.)
The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether Sparkes was in fact engaging in
unlicensed outfitting and guiding. (R. Vol. 4 p. 678.) Officers Joey Ishida, Jr. and Brandon
Chamberlin were the undercover officers. (R. Vol. 1 p. 161 ll. 2-6.)
Ishida began undercover communications with Sparkes on July 10, 2012. (R. Vol. 4 p.
679.) Ishida set up a rifle elk hunt on the leased property through Sparkes. Id. at p. 679.
Sparkes told Ishida: “We put you in good areas where they are coming and going.” Id. at p. 680.
Sparkes also told Ishida: “It has taken me a lot of years to know the knowledge of my animals
and that’s why we are very successful because I know exactly what they are going to do.
Exactly the trails they go up and exactly the path they come out. So, I mean I have had six guys
kill six cow elk in four days. That’s not from lack of knowledge and I can assure you, it’s not
luck.” Id. at p. 708. Sparkes also made the following representations to Ishida:
- “M2D CAMO PROPERTIES will not be responsible for any accident resulting
from the behavior of a client or actions contrary to the directions of outfitters or
guides.” Id. at p. 689 (emphasis added).
- “M2D CAMO PROPERTIES will provide a house to sleep in with bed
including sheets, washer, dryer, showers, and fully furnished kitchen for any extra
cooking needs. We do include house items like condiments, coffee, ketchup, etc.”
Id. at pp. 689-90.
- “M2D CAMO PROPERTIES is not responsible for any weather or unsafe
conditions that may arise due to an ‘Act of God’ during the hunt. To best ensure
the safety of our clients and guides these conditions may not allow us to hunt
while they exist.” Id. at p. 689 (emphasis added).
- “I am 100% interested in you getting an elk . . . and will do everything I can to
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help make that happen. I will assure you that nobody knows the land better, and
the routes of the animals than I do. You can choose to hunt anyway you like, as it
is your hunt, but I would highly recommend you take the first 3-4 days and do
exactly as I recommend and you have a very good chance at being on elk. If you
dont [sic] like my thoughts, ideas, or methods, than [sic] you can hunt your way
and I wish you the best of luck. I am no expert, but I have been hunting this area
for 7 years and think I have a pretty good idea of what you can expect. . . . I am
only here to offer you the BEST possible advice I can give you.” Id. at p. 697.
Ishida prepaid Sparkes $750 for the hunt. Id. at p. 694. Ishida’s hunt took place from
August 22-26, 2012. Id. at p. 692. Sparkes was not in Leadore during Ishida’s hunt, but assured
Ishida that Sparkes would “get [him] dialed in with what is going on” and “scout it out for
[him].” Id. at p. 695.

Sparkes provided Ishida advice via telephone regarding when, where and

how to hunt on the property. Id. at pp. 704 & 707-08. Sparkes also provided Ishida with food,
elk calls, and housing. Id. at p. 707.
Chamberlin began undercover communications with Sparkes in June 2012. (R. Vol. 4 p.
719.) Chamberlin booked an archery deer and elk hunt on the property through Sparkes. Id. at
p. 720. Sparkes charged Chamberlin $3,500 for the hunt. Id. at pp. 725, 727 & 729. Sparkes
informed Chamberlin how to hunt the animals on the property and made similar representations
to Chamberlin as he did to Ishida. Id. at p. 729. Sparkes also informed Chamberlin that he
would be provided with tree stands, blinds, and a harness and that one of Sparkes’ friends would
coordinate with Sparkes to find a “strategic” place for Chamberlin to hunt. Id. at pp. 735-36.
Chamberlin’s hunt took place from September 9-15, 2012. Id. at p. 736. Sparkes had
Chamberlin stay in a trailer house located on the property. Id. at p. 735. Sparkes, through one of
his “helpers” on the property, instructed Chamberlin where and how to hunt. Id. at p. 738.
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Sparkes also spoke directly to Chamberlin on the telephone and “spent several minutes
describing exactly where to put the cow blind in the green field . . . to target deer and elk coming
from the willows.” Id. at p. 741. Sparkes’ “helpers” drove Chamberlin to various hunting
locations, provided him with a harness and blind to hunt, cooked him breakfast and dinner, and
gave him numerous hunting tips including how to call, where to position himself, and the paths
the elk took. Id. at pp. 739, 741 & 743. Sparkes provided Chamberlin and other “clients” at the
property clothing from the M2D Camo line. Id. at p. 741. Chamberlin also learned that another
“helper” was taking clients from Iowa to various hunting locations on the property. Id. at p. 742.
Eventually Chamberlin harvested a deer. (R. Vol. 4 p. 746.) One of Sparkes’ “helpers”
transported the deer from the field, field dressed, quartered, and caped the deer for Chamberlin,
and took the deer to a taxidermist in Texas. Id. at pp. 748-49. The deer cape and antlers were
stored in a freezer on the property.

Id. at p. 750.

The “helper” accepted payment from

Chamberlin for fuel and caping the deer. Id. at p. 757. Chamberlin learned that Sparkes gave
“gifts” to and traded hunts with at least one of his “helpers.” Id. at p. 744. This “helper” referred
to his time on the property as a “working vacation.” Id. at p. 753.
Chamberlin and Ishida both confirmed during their investigations that Sparkes’ “helpers”
and “clients” at the property were from various states and that they hunted at various locations all
over the country. Id. at p. 748. Evidence also showed that Sparkes and his “helpers” videoed
and photographed the hunts conducted in Idaho and in other locations to promote M2D’s
camouflage clothing line. Id. at p. 751. Based upon the magnitude and scope of Sparkes’
operations, IDFG referred the case to the USFWS in late 2012. (R. Vol. 1 p. 164 ll. 2-4.)
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In April 2013, USFWS Special Agent Scott Kabasa applied for federal search warrants
based in large part upon the information obtained during the investigations conducted by
Chamberlin and Ishida. (R. Vol. 4 p. 762.) Kabasa determined that Sparkes likely violated the
Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(c)(1)(A), which makes it illegal to transport across state lines
animals sold or taken in violation of state law. Id. Sparkes was suspected of transporting
animals across state lines that were taken in violation of Idaho’s prohibition against unlicensed
guiding and outfitting. Id. U.S. Magistrate Judge Cynthia Imbrogno issued the warrants on
April 9, 2013. Id. at pp. 762, 799 & 835. The warrants authorized USFWS to search Sparkes’
residence/business and vehicles/trailers located on that property, Sparkes’ person, and Sparkes’
pickup truck. Id. The warrants authorized USFWS to seize, among other things, computers,
correspondence, financial statements, bills, records, tax returns, Sparkes’ cellular telephone,
maps, video editing equipment and software, and photographs that could relate to the unlicensed
provision of guiding or outfitting services in Idaho. Id.
A briefing of all officers involved in executing the search warrants was held on April 9,
2013. (R. Vol. 3 p. 544.) The search warrants were executed on April 10, 2013 by officers from
USFWS, IDFG, and Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 162 & 183.)
The searches resulted in the seizure of various items of personal property. (R. Vol. 5 p. 979.)
However, federal and county prosecutors ultimately elected not to charge Sparkes with a crime
because Idaho began considering repealing, and ultimately did repeal, the prohibition against
unlicensed outfitting and guiding on private property. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 570-71.) The property
seized during the searches was returned to Sparkes after the prosecutors made their decisions. Id.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Sparkes raises thirteen issues presented on appeal. The State believes the issues on appeal
are more accurately stated as follows:
1.

Did the district court correctly conclude there were no genuine issues of material fact that

precluded granting summary judgment in favor of the State on all of Sparkes’ claims?
2.

Even if the district court’s reasoning for granting summary judgment was incorrect, are

there alternative grounds for upholding the district court’s grant of summary judgment?
3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Sparkes leave to amend his

Complaint?
4.

Is the State entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
ARGUMENT
The arguments set forth in Appellant’s Opening Brief are not structured as to particular

claims or issues, and incorrectly intermingle state tort law rules with federal constitutional law.
For purposes of providing some structure and clarity to the issues to be addressed on appeal, the
arguments set forth in this brief will be arranged to correspond to the State’s categorization of the
issues to be addressed on appeal and the causes of action set forth in Sparkes’ Complaint.
A.

Standard of Review.
“This Court exercises de novo review of a grant of summary judgment and the ‘standard

of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court . . . .’” AED, Inc. v. KDC
Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 163 (2013). “The court must grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
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to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). “Where ‘the evidence reveals no disputed issues
of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free
review.’” AED, Inc., 155 Idaho at 163. Issues of material fact exist with regards to claims of
violations of civil or constitutional rights only if the allegations are specific and supported in the
record. I.R.C.P. 9(b); E. Idaho Econ. Dev. Council v. Lockwood Packaging Corp., 139 Idaho
492, 496 (2003). “[T]he nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that
an issue of material fact exists.” Id.
In reviewing the denial of a motion for reconsideration, “this Court utilizes the same
standard of review used by the lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration.”
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 (2012). “[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a
motion for reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must determine
whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.”
Id. This Court exercises free review if the “decision turned on a question of law.” Id.
B.

No Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment.
The district court correctly granted summary judgment on all of Sparkes’ claims. There

are several grounds for upholding the grant of summary judgment. The federal claims against
IDFG, the Board, and the officers in their official capacities fail because those defendants are not
“persons” subject to suit under § 1983 and the claims fail on the merits. The federal claims
against the officers in their individual capacities fail because there is no evidence each individual
officer engaged in particular conduct that purportedly violated any constitutional right, the
claims fail on the merits, and the officers are at the very least entitled to qualified immunity. The
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state law claims against the officers fail because Sparkes failed to post a bond within the time
prescribed by I.C. § 6-610, the officers are immune under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), and
the claims fail on the merits. The state law claims against IDFG and the Board fail both on the
merits and under the ITCA. For these reasons and as more fully explained below, the Decision,
as modified by the district court at the hearing on Sparkes’ Motion for Reconsideration, was
correct and the grant of summary judgment on all of Sparkes’ claims should be upheld.
1.

Federal Claims.
a. Claims Against IDFG, the Board, and the Officers in Their Official
Capacities.
Sparkes’ Complaint asserted the following 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against IDFG, the

Board, and the officers in their official capacities: malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of
substantive and procedural due process, failure to train and supervise, and unlawful search and
seizure. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 20-39.) The district court granted summary judgment on all of those
claims based upon its conclusion that IDFG, the Board, and their respective officers acting in
their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. (R. Vol. 5 p. 1088.) The
district court’s conclusion was correct and is not subject to legitimate debate.

Kessler v.

Barowsky, 129 Idaho 647, 655 (1997) (“The state of Idaho is not a ‘person’ for purposes of §
1983. . . . A suit against a state official acting in an official capacity is nothing more than a suit
against the state, and state officials acting in their official capacity are not ‘persons’ under §
1983.”); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (“State agencies . . . are not
‘persons' within the meaning of § 1983 and are therefore not amenable to suit under that
statute.”); I.C. § 36-101 (IDFG is “an executive department of the state government”); I.C. § 36-

– 15 –

2105 (Board is part of Idaho state executive agency). Sparkes’ legal counsel conceded as much
at the summary judgment hearing. (Tr., 1/5/17, p. 11 l. 18-20.)
Sparkes is patently incorrect in arguing that “[t]he determination as to who is a ‘person’
and thus who can be sued is determined by the law of the state, and that law is applied in § 1983
actions . . . .” Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 383 (1990); James v.
Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686 (2016). Sparkes is also incorrect that the ITCA subjects the State to
suit under § 1983. I.C. § 6-903(6). Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against IDFG, the Board,
and their officers in their official capacities were properly dismissed.
b. Individual Capacity Claims Against Officers of IDFG and the Board.
Sparkes’ Complaint asserted the following claims against the officers in their individual
capacities: malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of substantive and procedural due process,
failure to train and supervise, and unlawful search and seizure. The district court clarified during
the hearing on Sparkes’ Motion for Reconsideration that summary judgment on those claims was
appropriate because Sparkes failed to present evidence or even allege what particular conduct of
each officer allegedly violated any constitutional right.1 (Tr., 3/24/27, pp. 20-21.) The district
court’s conclusion was correct.
Sparkes failed to present evidence that any of the officers engaged in particular conduct
that allegedly violated Sparkes’ rights. Dockery v. Tucker, 2006 WL 5893295, at *13 (E.D.N.Y.
1

Sparkes contends the Decision was erroneous because it mistakenly stated that Sparkes’
proposed Amended Complaint would not include any claims against the officers in their
individual capacities. However, the district court clarified at the hearing on Sparkes’ Motion for
Reconsideration that the proposed Amended Complaint included individual capacity claims, but
that the claims nonetheless failed under I.R.C.P. 9(b). (Tr., 3/24/17, pp. 20-21.)
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2006) (“In order to maintain an action against a . . . state officer or official under . . . section
1983, a plaintiff must establish specific facts demonstrating that defendant's personal
involvement in the constitutional violations alleged.”); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930,
934 (2d Cir.1977) (“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations
is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”). Sparkes presented no evidence that
any of the officers were personally involved in any of the actions or decisions Sparkes contends
deprived him of his rights. Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against the officers in their individual
capacities were properly dismissed. And, even if the grant of summary judgment on that basis
was incorrect, dismissal of the claims should be upheld on the following alternative bases.
Syringa Networks, LLC v. Dep't of Admin., 159 Idaho 813, 828 (2016) (“[T]he Court ‘will
uphold the decision of a trial court if any alternative legal basis can be found to support it.’”).
(1)

42 U.S.C. § 1983: Malicious Prosecution.

The State pointed out during the summary judgment proceedings that Sparkes’ malicious
prosecution claim failed because Sparkes was never prosecuted. The claim thereafter morphed
into a state law claim based upon the alleged malicious procurement of the search warrants – a
claim not asserted in the Complaint. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 20-32.) However, Sparkes’ legal counsel
conceded at the summary judgment hearing that the warrants were not improperly obtained.
(Tr., 1/5/17, p. 14 ll. 16-17.) The basis for Sparkes’ appeal of the dismissal of the malicious
prosecution claim is therefore unclear. The claim was properly dismissed because Sparkes was
never subject to prosecution, there was no evidence the officers acted with malice, without
probable cause, or with a purpose of denying Sparkes of a constitutional right, and the officers
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are entitled to qualified immunity.
“In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must show
that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did
so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.’”
Awabdy v. Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). Sparkes admits he was never subject
to prosecution. (R. Vol. 5 p. 980.) His malicious prosecution claim therefore failed on this basis
alone. Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (malicious prosecution claim
failed even though plaintiff was arrested because no “process resulting in the initiation of
criminal proceedings followed this arrest”).
Sparkes’ malicious prosecution claim was also properly dismissed because Sparkes failed
to present evidence that any of the officers acted with malice. “‘Actual malice in the context of
malicious prosecution is defined as either ill will in the sense of spite, lack of belief by the actor
himself in the propriety of the prosecution, or its use for an extraneous improper purpose.’”
Lucia v. Carroll, 2014 WL 1767527, at *5 (D.N.J. 2014). Here, the officers all presented
evidence that they did not harbor any ill will or spite towards Sparkes and that they did not
execute the search warrants or investigate Sparkes for an improper purpose. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 24849, 266-67, 326-27, 349-50, 387-88, 413-14, 465; R. Vol. 4 pp. 495-96, 571-72, 601-02; R. Vol.
1 p. 171 l. 25 to p. 172 l. 4.) The officers also presented evidence that they did not question or
have reason to question the proprietary of the investigation or the search warrants. (R. Vol. 2 pp.
247-48, 265-66, 325-26, 348-49, 386-87, 412-13; R. Vol. 4 pp. 494-95, 571, 600-01.) Wadley
was not even involved in the investigation or execution of the search warrants. (R. Vol. 2 p.
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465.) Sparkes did not present any evidence to dispute the officers’ testimony.
The claim was also properly dismissed because there was probable cause for the searches
and seizures. Joseph v. Allen, 712 F.3d 1222, 1228 (8th Cir. 2013). An officer has probable
cause “when ‘the facts available to [him] would ‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the
belief’ that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243
(2013). “Probable cause . . . is not a high bar: It requires only the kind of fair probability on
which reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.” Kaley v. U.S., 134 S. Ct.
1090, 1103 (2014).
In 2012 and 2013, I.C. § 36-2104(1) made it “a misdemeanor for any person to engage in
the business of or act in the capacity of an outfitter or outfitting, or in the occupation of guiding,
unless such person has first secured an outfitter's or guide's license in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter . . . .” “Outfitter” was defined to mean “any person who, while
engaging in any of the acts enumerated herein in any manner: (1) advertises or otherwise holds
himself out to the public for hire; (2) provides facilities and services for consideration; and (3)
maintains, leases, or otherwise uses equipment or accommodations for compensation for the
conduct of outdoor recreational activities limited to the following: hunting animals or birds . . . .”
I.C. § 36-2102(b) (2001). “Guide” was defined to mean “any natural person who is employed by
a licensed outfitter to furnish personal services for the conduct of outdoor recreational activities
directly related to the conduct of activities for which the employing outfitter is licensed. . . .”
I.C. § 36-2102(c) (2001). The statute at that time prohibited unlicensed guiding and outfitting on
both public and private land. State v. Koller, 122 Idaho 409, 411 (1992).
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Case law applying § 36-2104 confirms that the officers had probable cause to believe
Sparkes was violating the statute. In Koller, this Court upheld a conviction under § 36-2104 for
outfitting without a license on private land where an undercover agent saw newspaper
advertisements and a brochure for guided hunts on private land, the agent paid the defendant a
fee, the defendant provided the agent with overnight accommodations and served him dinner and
breakfast, the defendant drove the agent around the property searching for deer and advised the
agent where to shoot, and the defendant videotaped the hunt. Id. at 410. In addition, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a conviction for violating the Lacey Act where the defendant was not licensed to
outfit bear in Idaho, he allowed hunters to lodge at his house, his assistants transported hunters to
and from hunting areas, he and/or his assistants transported harvested animals back to the house,
and he kept a freezer for storing game killed by hunters. U.S. v. Powers, 923 F.2d 131, 132 (9th
Cir. 1990). The Court reasoned that the defendant violated Idaho law by providing outfitting
services without a license, which was sufficient to support a conviction for transporting and
assisting others in transporting game in violation of the Lacey Act. Id.
Here, the undisputed evidence showed that the officers had reason to believe Sparkes was
outfitting without a license in violation of Idaho law and, consequently, the Lacey Act. Sparkes
advertised hunts on his websites and EBay. (R. Vol. 4 p. 808.) Sparkes charged a fee for hunters
to hunt on his leased property. Id. Sparkes and his “helpers” showed hunters around the leased
property, provided them with hunting equipment, told them where and how to hunt the property,
photographed and videotaped hunts and harvested animals, provided “clients” with room and
board, and assisted clients with dressing, transporting and caping (skinning) their harvested
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animals. (R. Vol. 4 p. 704, 707-08, 729, 735-36, 738-41, 748-49.) Animals harvested were also
taken out of state. Id. at 748-49. Sparkes did not have a license for outfitting or guiding in
Idaho. (R. Vol. 2 p. 465.) The officers thus had reason to believe there was probable cause that
Sparkes committed a crime. Sparkes presented absolutely no evidence that the officers acted
other than for that reason or that they acted with a purpose to deprive Sparkes of any
constitutional right. Dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim was proper.
Finally, dismissal of the claim should be upheld based upon qualified immunity.
“Government officials are immune from liability for civil damages under § 1983 unless their
conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990). “Qualified
immunity ‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken
judgments,’ and ‘protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012). “[T]he relevant question is
whether ‘the state of the law at the time gives officials fair warning that their conduct is
unconstitutional.’”

Ellins v. Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013). “‘[T]he

contours of [the] right [must be] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011). “[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.”

Id.

“That is, existing precedent must have ‘placed beyond debate the

unconstitutionality of” the officials’ actions, as those actions unfolded in the specific context of
the case at hand.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2016). “[T]he dispositive

– 21 –

question is ‘whether the violative nature of [the] particular conduct is clearly established.’”
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015).
Here, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly
established constitutional protection against malicious prosecution.2 Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1070.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), that the due process
clause does not protect against malicious prosecution. Id. at 274. Albright did not decide
whether the Fourth Amendment could support a malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 275. That
question remains unanswered by the U.S. Supreme Court and courts across the country are
divided on the issue. Green v. Turner, 2010 WL 8917938, at *5 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (“[T]here is no
such thing as a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution’ claim.”); Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939,
949 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[O]ur precedent governing § 1983 malicious prosecution claims is a mix of
misstatements and omissions which leads to the inconsistencies and difficulties . . . . Other
circuits have traveled uneven paths as well, and numerous approaches have developed after
Albright. . . . we conclude that no such freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious
prosecution exists.”); Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1071 n.4 (“There is considerable confusion among
the . . . circuits that have attempted to determine the applicable law as established by Albright.”).
2

They were also entitled to qualified immunity because, at the very least, they had reason to
believe probable cause existed. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (“[I]t is
inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude
that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials—like
other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful—should not be held
personally liable.”); Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1245 (“‘[A]n officer cannot be expected to
question the magistrate's probable-cause determination’ because ‘[i]t is the magistrate's
responsibility to determine whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to
issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.’”).
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In light of the conflict between the Circuits and the absence of any definitive U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, there is no clearly established constitutional right to be free from
malicious prosecution. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (doubtful that a right can
be clearly established when there is no U.S. Supreme Court decision making it clear to every
reasonable official that his or her actions would violate a particular right and when there is
disagreement in the courts of appeals).

The individual officers were therefore entitled to

summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. Ferguson v. Short, 2014 WL 3925512, at *5
(W.D. Mo. 2014) (“[T]he Court need not resolve the thorny issue of whether any provision of the
U.S Constitution prohibits a ‘malicious prosecution’, because even if such a right exists, it was
not clearly established . . . and therefore Defendants . . . are entitled to qualified immunity.”);
Bates v. Hadden, 576 F. App'x 636, 639 (8th Cir. 2014) (officer entitled to qualified immunity on
malicious prosecution claim because “[a]s recently as 2012, we expressed uncertainty as to
whether ‘malicious prosecution is a constitutional violation at all”).
(2)

42 U.S.C. § 1983: Malicious Abuse of Substantive and
Procedural Due Process.

Sparkes’ claims for malicious abuse of substantive and procedural due process were
based upon alleged deprivations of liberty and property interests Sparkes had in his chosen
profession and an alleged “time delay” in returning property seized pursuant to the federal
warrants. The claims were properly dismissed because they were subsumed by the Fourth
Amendment, the claims failed on the merits, and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
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(a)

Due Process Claims in General.

The Fourth Amendment – not the Fourteenth Amendment – governs the lawfulness of
searches and seizures and the process due when the government conducts searches and seizures.
Dowling v. Barberton, 2008 WL 4415931, at *7-8 (N.D. Ohio 2008); Holman v. Warrenton, 242
F. Supp. 2d 791, 802 (D. Or. 2002). The law does not recognize a separate due process claim
based upon an alleged unlawful search or seizure. Sanders v. San Diego, 93 F.3d 1423, 1429
(9th Cir. 1996). Sparkes’ argument that he was entitled to “notice and an opportunity for
hearing” therefore fails. Vandenburgh v. Hendrix, 2009 WL 4723605, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(“[P]laintiff is not entitled to a hearing or other procedural due process prior to the execution of a
search once a search warrant has been issued.”); Montana Caregivers Ass'n, LLC v. U.S., 841 F.
Supp. 2d 1147, 1151 (D. Mont. 2012) (“There is ‘no [procedural due process] requirement of a
prior hearing before the seizure of possessions under a search warrant.’”). Sparkes’ due process
claims were properly dismissed because they were subsumed by the Fourth Amendment.
Sparkes’ due process claims were also properly dismissed because Sparkes was not
deprived of a cognizable liberty or property interest. Nunez v. L.A., 147 F.3d 867, 871 (1998);
Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). Sparkes was not deprived of a liberty
interest because he was not completely prohibited from engaging in outfitting, guiding, or any
other profession. Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 954 (9th Cir.2009); see also Conn v.
Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292 (1999) (lawyer's “Fourteenth Amendment right to practice one's
calling [was] not violated by the execution of a search warrant, whether calculated to annoy or
even to prevent consultation with a grand jury witness”); Marino v. City Univ., 18 F. Supp. 3d
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320, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[O]ne must have no ability to practice one's profession at all in
order to state a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest.” (emphasis added)); Prof'l Dog
Breeders Advisory Council, Inc. v. Wolff, 752 F. Supp. 2d 575, 600 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(“‘[P]laintiffs must allege an inability to obtain employment within the field, not just a particular
job or at a specific location or facility.’”); Denney v. DEA, 508 F. Supp. 2d 815, 835 (E.D. Cal.
2007) (alleged damage to medical practice arising from DEA investigation was not the type of
complete prohibition that could support a due process claim); Cleavenger v. Univ. of Oregon,
2015 WL 4663304, at *14 (D. Or. 2015) (due process claim based upon alleged inability to
pursue an occupation “is available only in ‘extreme cases’”). Sparkes admitted he was not
completely prohibited from engaging in his profession and, therefore, the due process claims
failed. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 126-27.)
Sparkes’ was not deprived of a property interest because he did not have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to engage in outfitting or guiding. Sparkes did not even apply for, let alone
obtain, the license previously required to engage in outfitting or guiding on private property. (R.
Vol. 2 p. 465); Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2007)
(whether a legitimate claim of entitlement exists is a question of law determined by reference to
state law); I.C. § 36-2104 (2013) (requiring license to engage in commercial outfitting or
guiding); Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (“[A] benefit is not a protected
entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.”); I.C. § 36-2109(a)
(“[T]he board, in its discretion may issue a license to any applicant who has filed an application
in proper form with the board . . . .” (emphasis added)). If anything, the State made it easier for
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Sparkes to engage in outfitting and guiding by amending the licensing statute to permit outfitting
and guiding on private property without a license I.C. § 36-2103(1)(a) & (2).
The seizure and retention of Sparkes’ personal property similarly was not a cognizable
deprivation of liberty or property. The seized property was returned to Sparkes by July 2015.
(R. Vol. 5 p. 979.) The property was retained pending federal and county prosecutors’ analysis
of whether to prosecute Sparkes.3 (R. Vol. 3 p. 570.) Any alleged delay in returning the seized
items does not support a due process claim. Sterling v. Weaver, 146 F. App'x 136, 139 (9th Cir.
2005) (“The County's retention of [plaintiff’s] property was proper because there was a
continuing evidentiary need for the items seized.”); Malone v. Yee, 2009 WL 10672938, at *4
(D. Ariz. 2009); see also Malapanis v. Regan, 335 F. Supp. 2d 285, 293 (D. Conn. 2004) (claim
that seizure and failure to return property deprived plaintiff of liberty interest because she was
not able to operate her business failed because retention of seized equipment did not completely
prohibit plaintiff from engaging in her chosen profession); Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019,
1023 (9th Cir. 2003) (An “indirect and incidental burden on professional practice is far too
removed from a complete prohibition to support a due process claim.”); Desfosses v. Keller, 667
F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218 (D. Idaho 2009) (seizure of mining equipment did not deprive plaintiff of

3

Accordingly, the testimony of Sparkes’ law enforcement expert speculating as to whether there
was a “legitimate law enforcement purpose” for retaining the property is irrelevant and does not
create a genuine issue of material fact. Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002),
abrogated on other grounds by County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017)
(plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment by simply producing expert opinion that officer’s
conduct was unreasonable; expert’s disagreement with officer’s actions does not render officer’s
actions unreasonable because “the court must decide as a matter of law ‘whether a reasonable
officer could have believed that his conduct was justified’”).
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right to engage in occupation of mining).
Sparkes nonetheless contends summary judgment was improper because factual disputes
allegedly exist as to whether he was driven out of the business of selling camouflaged clothing
by an alleged pattern of harassment. Sparkes’ argument fails because there was no evidence any
of the officers engaged in a pattern of harassment. Sparkes’ evidence consisted only of alleged
conduct by unidentified IDFG officers that purportedly occurred years after the searches and
seizures that are the subject of the Complaint. (R. Vol. 5 pp. 979-81.) And, in any event,
Sparkes has no standing to pursue a claim for alleged interference with the camouflage clothing
business of M2D, Inc. – the separate legal entity through which the clothing sales were
conducted. (R. Vol. 5 p. 976); Proskauer Rose, LLP v. Blix St. Records, Inc., 384 F. App'x 622,
624 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff], as an individual shareholder of [the corporation], also lacks
standing to complain of injury to the corporation.”); RK Ventures, Inc. v. Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045,
1057 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[S]hareholders lack standing to assert an individual § 1983 claim based on
harm to the corporation in which they own shares.”); Hardesty v. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality
Mgmt. Dist., 2012 WL 1131387, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“[S]ubstantive due process does not
constitutionalize a claim for tortious interference with contract. . . . Plaintiffs' claim shows at
most only interference with potential contracts, not a wholesale prevention of their right to
conduct business. This does not state a constitutional claim.”).
Finally, summary judgment on the due process claims should be upheld because the
individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Sparkes did not cite any law clearly
establishing that the officers knew or should have known their particular conduct in assisting
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execute federal search warrants would allegedly cause damage to a separate corporate entity’s
camouflage clothing sales, deprive an unlicensed outfitter/guide of a right to engage in outfitting
and guiding, or otherwise violate clearly established law. Guzman, 552 F.3d at 954 (“The
Supreme Court has not defined the boundaries of an individual's right to pursue his chosen
profession.’”); Nahas v. Mountain View, 2005 WL 1683617, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“Plaintiffs
fail . . . to show that either a liberty interest in (1) owning and operating a business or (2)
preserving one's reputation is recognized as a substantive due process right . . . .”).
(b)

Substantive Due Process Claim.

There is an alternative ground for upholding summary judgment specific to Sparkes’
substantive due process claim. Namely, Sparkes failed to produce evidence any of the officers
engaged in conscience-shocking conduct.

Nunez, 147 F.3d at 871 (“[T]he concept of

‘substantive due process’ . . . forbids the government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property in such a way that ‘shocks the conscience’ or interferes with rights implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”). The officers merely participated in an investigation of possible law
violations by assisting federal officials in the execution of federal search warrants. Sparkes
failed to present any evidence or authority that such conduct could constitute conscience
shocking behavior. Dowling, 2008 WL 4415931, at *7 (obtaining a search warrant and seizing
gaming machines was not “conscience-shocking”); Malapanis, 335 F.Supp.2d at 295 (“Having
acted pursuant to a presumptively reasonable warrant, the failure of the police defendants to
return the seized property, even if they later learned of the falsities in the warrant application, is
not so ‘outrageously arbitrary’ that it shocks the conscience.”).
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(c)

Procedural Due Process Claim.

Alternative bases also support the grant of summary judgment on Sparkes’ procedural
due process claim. The undisputed evidence showed that Sparkes failed to pursue available postdeprivation remedies. Malapanis, 335 F.Supp.2d at 291-92 (no viable procedural due process
claim based upon retention of seized property even though criminal proceedings were not
instituted because plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of post-deprivation remedies); McKenna v.
Portman, 538 F. App'x 221 (3d Cir. 2013) (no procedural due process claim based upon seizure
of property pursuant to a warrant where state statute provided procedure to challenge seizure of
property and request its return); Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 873 (8th Cir.1998) (seizing
items allegedly outside the scope of search warrant did not deprive plaintiffs of due process
because plaintiffs failed to exhaust state post-deprivation remedy of petitioning the court for
return of the seized property). Sparkes admitted that IDFG did not even have custody of the
seized property until July 2014. (Tr., 1/5/17, p. 16 l. 25 to p. 17 l. 3.) The undisputed evidence
showed that procedures were available for Sparkes to seek return of his property both before and
after it was transferred to IDFG, but that Sparkes failed to utilize those procedures. I.C.R. 41.1;
I.C. § 19-4418; Fed. Crim. R. 41(g).
Sparkes attempts to save his claim by arguing his failure to pursue post-deprivation
remedies was due to his alleged lack of knowledge of applicable law and the location of the
seized property. However, Sparkes was represented by counsel during the searches and seizures
and during the time period the property was being held as potential evidence. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 13135; R. Vol. 3 pp. 544, 548-50; Tr., 1/5/17, p. 19 ll. 3-15.)
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Sparkes attached to his own

declaration a Property Receipt specifically identifying USFWS as the agency taking custody of
the evidence. (R. Vol. 5 p. 995.) And, even if Sparkes truly lacked knowledge as to the location
of the property and available post-deprivation remedies, he still was not deprived of due process.
Dockery, 2006 WL 5893295, at *10 (“Plaintiff's unawareness of his post-deprivation remedies
under federal and state tort law does not render the remedies inadequate to address the harms
alleged.”); Fox v. Van Oosterum, 987 F. Supp. 597, 605-06 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (rejecting
argument that post-deprivation remedies were inadequate in light of plaintiff’s “insufficient
education, lack of knowledge of the law, indigency and incarceration”).
Summary judgment was also proper because, even if Sparkes had a viable claim based
upon the alleged “time delay” in returning the seized property, he did not present any evidence
that “any of the individual . . . officer defendants . . . had an individual and continuing duty to
ensure the return of [his] property . . . .” Koller v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2016 WL 4773133, at
*6 (D. Conn. 2016). Sparkes did not show that each officer had possession, control, or access to
the seized property after it was transferred to IDFG, knowledge that the property was transferred
to IDFG, a duty to assure Sparkes received notice that the federal government transferred the
property to IDFG, or authority to return the property to Sparkes. Moreover, after USFWS
transferred Sparkes’ property to IDFG and the county prosecutor declined to press charges,
IDFG returned the property to Sparkes. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 570-71.) For these reasons, the officers
were at the very least entitled to qualified immunity. Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971,
977 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The plaintiff shoulders the burden of proving that the rights he claims are
‘clearly established.’”).
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Sparkes’ inexplicable contention that he was deprived of procedural due process because
he was not cited or charged with a crime likewise does not save his claim. Sparkes was not
entitled to have the officers cite or charge him. It is the county prosecuting attorney’s duty to
prosecute state game violations. I.C. § 36-1302(b). A prosecutor’s decision as to whether or not
to pursue charges is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Dohaish v. Tooley, 670 F.2d 934, 938
(10th Cir. 1982). Sparkes cannot circumvent this immunity by suing the officers for the federal
and county prosecutors’ decisions not to prosecute – particularly where there is no evidence any
of the officers were involved in those decisions. Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.
1990) (“The decision to file or not to file criminal charges falls within this category of acts that
will not give rise to section 1983 liability.”); People v. Cole, 2006 WL 626573, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (“[I]t was the district attorney, not the police, who was the ultimate decision maker
on the issue of whether he would be charged with a crime.”). Sparkes’ argument that he should
have been charged or cited so he could obtain judicial review misses the mark. The search
warrants were issued by a federal judge. The federal judge’s review, approval, and issuance of
those warrants satisfied any right to judicial review. Sanders, 93 F.3d at 1429.
Sparkes’ claim that he was entitled to a name clearing hearing also fails because the
claim was not asserted in his Complaint and there is no evidence such a hearing was requested
but denied. Vanvooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440, 443 (2005); Naples v. Lowellville Police Dep’t,
125 F. App’x 636, 644 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, it would be unreasonable to conclude that
every person who is investigated, but not ultimately charged with a crime, is entitled to a name
clearing hearing or judicial review. Sparkes has not cited any clearly established law to the
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contrary and, therefore, the officers are at least entitled to qualified immunity.
(3)

42 U.S.C. § 1983: Failure To Train And Supervise.

Sparkes’ claim was based upon an alleged failure to train, supervise, and discipline
officers for alleged harassment, unlawful prosecution, unlawful seizures, conspiring to violate
legal rights, and depriving Sparkes of his rights. The claim was properly dismissed because
Sparkes’ constitutional rights were not violated, the officers were not supervisors, the officers
did not engage in any culpable action or inaction, and there was no reason to believe any of the
officers needed additional training or supervision.
Sparkes’ supervisory liability claim fails because there was no underlying constitutional
violation to support such a claim. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). The
claim also fails because none of the officers were supervisors of the investigation or execution of
the federal warrants.4 (R. Vol. 1 p. 160 ll. 13-20, p. 170; R. Vol. 3 p. 570); Starr v. Baca, 652
F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). There was also no evidence any of the officers engaged in
culpable action or inaction that could subject them to liability. OSU Student Alliance v. Ray,
699 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Section 1983 suits . . . do not support vicarious liability.
. . . [E]ach government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct.”). Finally, the claim fails because there was no evidence of any reason to believe
the officers needed additional training, supervision, or control regarding investigatory procedures

4

Contrary to Sparkes’ suggestion, whether the State of Idaho or its agencies failed to properly
train or supervise or had unconstitutional polices is irrelevant because those entities are not
subject to suit under § 1983.
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or searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals has specifically held that the POST training,
certification, and continuing education requirements of IDFG provide IDFG officers adequate
training. Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho 923, 925 (Ct. App. 1992). There was no evidence to support
a claim for failure to train or supervise and the grant of summary judgment was proper.
(4)

42 U.S.C. § 1983: Search and Seizure.

Sparkes’ Fourth Amendment claim was based upon searches and seizures that occurred
on April 10, 2013 at the following locations: 16111 North Gleneden Drive, Spokane, WA
(Sparkes’ residence); 4220 E. Rowan, Spokane, WA (warehouse); 2220 East Colbert, Spokane,
WA (garage owned by Sparkes’ roommate’s ex-wife); 3720 Rockwell Avenue, Spokane, WA
(videographer’s residence); and 77 Big 8 Mile Road, Leadore, ID (property leased by Sparkes).
(R. Vol. 1 pp. 23-24.)

Sparkes’ legal counsel admitted that there was no evidence false

information was used to procure the search warrants and that the warrants were supported by
probable cause. (Tr., 1/5/17, p. 14 ll. 16-18, p. 17 l. 25 to p. 18 l. 2.) Sparkes’ counsel further
conceded that Sparkes was not contending the warrants should not have been issued, that they
were issued based upon incomplete information, or that they were sought out of malice.5 Id. at p.
14 ll. 3-18. Sparkes nevertheless attempts to save the claim on appeal by arguing the Fourth
Amendment was violated because he was not charged with a crime, there was a dispute as to
whether he was illegally selling LAP tags, there was a delay in returning the seized property, and
he did not receive notice as to where the property was located, who had possession of the

5

These concessions undermine Sparkes’ argument that the procurement of the search warrants
can serve as the basis for his malicious prosecution claim.
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property, or how he could get the property returned.6
There are several bases for upholding the grant of summary judgment. Sparkes failed to
present evidence that any of the officers engaged in culpable conduct. None of the officers
submitted the affidavits or applications for the search warrants. (R. Vol. 4 pp. 762, 799 & 835.)
The applications and affidavits were signed by Scott Kabasa, a federal USFWS officer. Id.
Kabasa’s affidavit was based primarily upon the investigations conducted by Ishida and
Chamberlin. Id. at 762-887. The investigative reports prepared by Ishida and Chamberlin were
supported by pictures and audio recordings. Id. at 715-17 & 758-59. There was no evidence that
Kabasa or any of the officers should have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of those
investigative reports. There was also no evidence that the officers provided Kabasa with false
information or had any reason to doubt the veracity of Kabasa’s affidavit. The information in
Kabasa’s affidavit gave rise to probable cause for the reasons explained above.
Summary judgment was also proper as to Sparkes’ claim regarding the searches at 2220
East Colbert Road and 4220 E. Rowan Road. Sparkes and his attorney signed consents to search
those locations. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 132-33; R. Vol. 3 pp. 548-50); see also U.S. v. Poom-Medina,
606 F. App'x 354, 355 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is
constitutionally permissible.”). Sparkes was not in custody when he consented to the searches,
Sparkes was advised of his rights, and Sparkes’ attorney was present. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 132-33; R.
Vol. 3 pp. 548-50.) The searches were therefore lawful and based upon valid consent.

6

These contentions further demonstrate why Sparkes’ due process claims are subsumed by his
Fourth Amendment claim.
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The searches of the hunting property in Leadore were not unlawful because Sparkes had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas under the open fields doctrine and consent
was given for the searches. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 566 & 568); Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984).
Sparkes’ claim with respect to the alleged search of 3720 West Rockwell Avenue fails
because no search was conducted at that location. The resident of the location voluntarily
provided officers with various items that were requested in a grand jury subpoena in lieu of
having to appear before the grand jury. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 530-34 & 536.)
Contrary to Sparkes’ contention, the searches and seizures were not rendered unlawful by
the fact that Sparkes ultimately was not charged with a crime. U.S. v. Comstock, 2008 WL
2222043, at *4 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (“For probable cause to exist, there need only be enough
evidence to warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has been or is being
committed; evidence sufficient to convict is not required.”). Sparkes was not charged because
Idaho’s outfitting and guiding laws were amended in 2014 to permit commercial guiding and
outfitting on private property without a license. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 164-65); I.C. § 36-2103(1)(a) &
(2); 2014 Idaho Laws Ch. 256 (H.B. 597). That statutory amendment did not retroactively
deprive the officers of probable cause.
Also contrary to Sparkes’ contention, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Idaho prohibited selling LAP tags or as to whether Sparkes illegally sold LAP tags.
Whether selling LAP tags was illegal is an issue of law and Sparkes is clearly incorrect as to the
legality of selling LAP tags. I.C. § 36-402 (1976); I.C. § 36-405(c)(2)(B) (2000); I.C. § 36202(aa) (1999). However, even if selling LAP tags was legal and even if Sparkes did not
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illegally sell LAP tags, those propositions do not create genuine issues of material fact. The
undisputed evidence showed that it was illegal at the time of the investigation and execution of
the warrants to engage in outfitting or guiding without a license, which was the primary subject
of the investigation and the subsequent searches and seizures. (R. Vol. 1 p. 167 l. 20.) There
was probable cause to believe Sparkes was engaging in unlawful guiding and outfitting
regardless of whether he was selling LAP tags. I.C. § 36-2104(1). Accordingly, even if there
was a dispute regarding whether Sparkes was legally selling LAP tags, that dispute did not create
a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment.
Sparkes’ claim based upon the alleged wrongful retention of the seized property also
fails. “[T]he failure to return property does not give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation
because it does not bring ‘about an additional seizure nor change[ ] the character of the [original]
seizure from a reasonable one to an unreasonable one because the seizure was already
complete.’” Malapanis, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 291; see also U.S. v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 802 (2d
Cir. 1992) (continued possession of photographs after criminal investigation was completed is
not a seizure “that deserves the special protections provided by the fourth amendment”); Koller,
2016 WL 4773133, at *5 (“[T]he failure of the police to return property that was properly seized
pursuant to a warrant in the first instance does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). And, to the
extent recently issued authority may support an argument to the contrary, the officers are still
entitled to qualified immunity. Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017); see also
Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044 (“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages
liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established

– 36 –

at the time of the challenged conduct.” (emphasis added)).
Finally, dismissal of Sparkes’ Fourth Amendment claim should be upheld because the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1245 (“Where the
alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact
that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in
an objectively reasonable manner or, as we have sometimes put it, in ‘objective good faith.’”).
Immunity is particularly appropriate when officers subject their steps during the investigation to
evaluation by prosecutors and judicial officials. Id.; see also Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250
(“The fact that none of the officials who reviewed the application expressed concern about its
validity demonstrates that any error was not obvious.”).
Here, the warrants and supporting affidavits were submitted by a USFWS agent who had
the assistance of a U.S. Attorney. (R. Vol. 1 p. 163 ll. 20-25, p. 174 ll. 7-9, p. 186 ll. 20-25; R.
Vol. 4 p. 664.) The warrants and supporting affidavits were then approved by a federal judge.
(R. Vol. 4 pp. 762, 799, 835.) All of the officers involved in executing the warrants reviewed the
warrants before they were executed. (R. Vol. 3 p. 544.) Those officers numbered over 50 and
represented at least three law enforcement agencies. (R. Vol. 1 p. 162 ll. 5-10 & p. 188 ll. 6-20.)
There is no evidence any of those officers questioned the validity of the warrants. There is also
no evidence any of the officers had reason to believe the statements in the warrant applications
were somehow untruthful or incorrect. Nor is there evidence any of the officers should have
known to cite Sparkes for a law violation while executing the federal search warrants or should
have known to return the seized property to Sparkes under the particular circumstances of this
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case. The officers were therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
2.

State Claims.
Sparkes’ Complaint asserted the following state law claims: intentional and/or negligent

infliction of emotional distress; conversion; “adverse tax consequences”7; and tortious
interference with economic expectation. Sparkes’ former legal counsel conceded at the hearing
on Sparkes’ Motion for Reconsideration that “the state claims are out.” (Tr., 3/24/17, p. 15 ll. 110.) However, in the event this Court nonetheless considers the propriety of the dismissal of
Sparkes’ state law claims, the dismissal should be upheld for the reasons explained below. State
v. Cohagan, No. 44800, 2017 WL 3623658, at *3 (Idaho 2017) (declining to consider issues on
appeal that were conceded below).
a. I.C. § 6-610.
The district court granted summary judgment on all of Sparkes’ state law claims based
upon Sparkes’ failure to timely comply with I.C. § 6-610, which provides in relevant part:
(2) Before any civil action may be filed against any law enforcement officer or
service of civil process on any law enforcement officer, when such action arises
out of, or in the course of the performance of his duty . . . the proposed plaintiff or
petitioner, as a condition precedent thereto, shall prepare and file with, and at
the time of filing the complaint or petition in any such action, a written
undertaking with at least two (2) sufficient sureties in an amount to be fixed by
the court.
...
(4) At any time during the course of a civil action against a law enforcement
officer, the defendant or respondent may except to either the plaintiff's or
petitioner's failure to file a bond . . . .
7

“Adverse tax consequences” is not a claim for relief and was thus properly dismissed pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 12(c). Estate of Holland v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94, 101 (2012).
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(5) When the defendant or respondent excepts to the plaintiff's or petitioner's
failure to post a bond under this section, the judge shall dismiss the case.
I.C. § 6-610(2), (4) & (5) (emphasis added).
Here, the officers are law enforcement officers who were performing their official duties
when they engaged in the alleged acts that gave rise to Sparkes’ claims. I.C. §§ 36-1301 & 362107(h). Sparkes was consequently required to post a bond before he filed his Complaint.
Sparkes neglected to post a bond until seven days after his Complaint was filed. (R. Vol. 1 p.
147.) Sparkes failed to timely comply with § 6-610 and, therefore, his state law claims against
the officers were properly dismissed. Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Kootenai Cty., 151 Idaho 405,
411 (2011) (state law claims against law enforcement officer were required to be dismissed
where plaintiff posted bond one day after filing complaint because “I.C. § 6–610(2) plainly
requires a plaintiff to post bond before it initiates suit against a law enforcement officer”).
b. Alternative Grounds for Dismissing All State Law Claims.
Sparkes’ tort claims failed on the alternative basis that the claims were barred by the
ITCA. I.C. § 6-904(1) provides in relevant part:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope
of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for
any claim which:
1. Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity . . .
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused.
A two part test is used to determine whether discretionary immunity should be afforded. Dorea
Enters., Inc. v. Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425 (2007). First, the Court “examine[s] the nature
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and quality of the challenged actions.” Id. “Routine, everyday matters not requiring evaluation
of broad policy factors will more likely than not be ‘operational.’ . . . Decisions involving a
consideration of the financial, political, economic and social effects of a policy or plan will
generally be planning and ‘discretionary.’” Id. Second, the Court “examine[s] the underlying
policies of the discretionary function, which are: to permit those who govern to do so without
being unduly inhibited by the threat of liability for tortious conduct, and also, to limit judicial reexamination of basic policy decisions properly entrusted to other branches of government.” Id.
Here, executing the search warrants and investigating possible criminal activity were
discretionary functions.

State v. Dotson, 879 S.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)

(“Execution of a search warrant is one of the discretionary acts to which the doctrine applies.”);
Robstown v. Ramirez, 17 S.W.3d 268, 272 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he officers performed
discretionary duties in obtaining and executing the warrant.”); Coppell v. Waltman, 997 S.W.2d
633, 637 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (searches involve “personal deliberation, decision, and
judgment”); Bashir v. Rockdale County, 2005 WL 6075367, at *12 (N.D. Ga. 2005), rev'd in
part on other grounds by 445 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[D]ecisions of law enforcement
officers to investigate, detain, arrest, use force, and charge a suspect with a crime are
discretionary functions for purposes of official immunity.”).
The policies underlying discretionary function immunity support affording immunity to
officers’ decisions and actions during investigations and warrant executions. Those decisions
and resulting actions are based upon the evaluation of numerous factors including “important
policy objectives: effective law enforcement; preservation of life; prevention of serious injury;
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and minimal property damage.” McGovern v. Minneapolis, 480 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); see also Donahue v. Commonwealth, 1994 WL 879767, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct.
1994) (“[T]he decisions of law enforcement officers whether, when, how, and whom to
investigate, and whether and when to seek warrants . . . are based on considerations of, and
necessarily affect, public policy.”). After such “a thoughtful and careful balance of policy
considerations has been struck, it should not be disturbed by judicial second-guessing.”
McGovern, 480 N.W.2d at 126; see also U.S. v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2009)
(“Monday-morning quarterbacking does nothing to assist our analysis” as to whether officers’
conclusions were reasonable). Accordingly, both prongs of the discretionary immunity analysis
require immunity be afforded in this case.
Sparkes’ claims were also barred by I.C. § 6-904(3), which affords immunity for claims
arising out of malicious prosecution, slander, misrepresentation, and interference with contract
rights. I.C. § 6-904(3). Sparkes’ arguments in opposition to summary judgment and on appeal
make clear that Sparkes’ claims were based upon alleged malicious prosecution, interference
with economic expectancies, and statements to third parties about the legality of Sparkes’
conduct.

Accordingly, Sparkes’ claims were subject to dismissal based upon § 6-904(3)

immunity. Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho 923, 924 (Ct. App. 1992) (IDFG officers immune under §
6-904(3) for claims arising from alleged improper investigation and application for and
execution of search warrant); Khurana v. N. Cent. Dist. Health Dep’t, 2012 WL 1288746, at *10
(D. Idaho 2012) (“[ITCA] immunity for intentional interference with contract extends to . . .
claims for intentional interference with economic expectancy and business relations.”).
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Next, Sparkes’ claims were barred by I.C. § 6-904B(1), which affords immunity to
governmental entities and their employees who act “without malice or criminal intent and
without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct” for all claims arising “out of
the detention of any goods or merchandise by any law enforcement officer.” I.C. § 6-904B(1).
Sparkes’ tort claims were also based on the detention of items seized pursuant to the federal
search warrants. The State is thus immune from liability.
There is no malice, criminal intent, gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton
conduct to overcome the officers’ immunity. “Malice” means actual malice, which is defined as
the “intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse
and with ill will, whether or not injury was intended.” Anderson v. Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,
188 (1986). “Criminal intent” is “the intentional commission of what the person knows to be a
crime.” James v. Boise, 160 Idaho 466, 484 (2016). The malicious or criminal conduct must
have been directed towards the plaintiff. Bates v. Yammamoto, 2014 WL 3881975, at *10 (D.
Idaho 2014). An employee presumably acts without malice or criminal intent. I.C. § 6-903(5).
Here, none of the officers acted with malice or criminal intent. None of the officers
committed a wrongful act or a crime – let alone did so intentionally. Nor did they harbor any ill
will, malice, or spite towards Sparkes. Sparkes made only conclusory allegations that IDFG and
unidentified officers acted with malice, which was insufficient to withstand summary judgment.
Anderson, 112 Idaho at 188 (bare allegations of malice do not defeat summary judgment).
“Gross negligence” “is the doing or failing to do an act which a reasonable person in a
similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum of contemplation, be
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inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty
shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others.”

I.C. § 6-904C(1).

“Reckless, willful and wanton conduct” “is present only when a person intentionally and
knowingly does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which
involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result.” I.C. § 6-904C(2). There was
no evidence any of the officers acted or failed to act with a deliberate indifference to any harmful
consequences to Sparkes – intentionally or otherwise.

Sparkes’ thus failed to present any

evidence to overcome the officers’ immunity under §§ 6-904(1) & (3) and 6-904B. And, even if
there was evidence of malice, criminal intent, gross negligence or recklessness, IDFG and the
Board would still be entitled to immunity. Hoffer v. Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 403 (2011).
Finally, the ITCA barred Sparkes’ tort claims to the extent the claims were based upon an
alleged negligent investigation. I.C. § 6-903(1) limits a governmental entity’s liability to those
situations in which “a private person or entity would be liable for money damages under the laws
of the state of Idaho.” I.C. § 6-903(1). “Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent
investigation.” Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618, 622 (Ct. App. 2002); see also Wimer, 122 Idaho at
924-25. A private person thus could not be held liable for damages based upon a negligent
investigation. Id. Accordingly, Sparkes’ tort claims based upon alleged inadequacies or errors
in the investigation were properly dismissed.
c. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED).
Sparkes’ NIED claim also failed on the merits. To succeed on a NIED claim, a plaintiff
must prove: “(1) a legal duty recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal
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connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury; . . . (4) actual loss or
damage[,] and (5) a physical manifestation of the plaintiff's emotional injury.” Frogley v.
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558, 569 (2013). The State did not breach any duty to
Sparkes for the reasons explained above. Sparkes also failed to present any evidence identifying
how each of the duties he alleged was breached applied to each officer and what conduct of each
officer allegedly breached those duties. The claim was thus properly dismissed.
d. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED).
Sparkes’ IIED claim also failed on the merits. A viable IIED claim requires proof that:
(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly, (2) engaged in conduct that was both extreme and
outrageous which, (3) caused emotional distress to the plaintiff, and (4) which was severe.
Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 601 (1993). Conduct must be “atrocious” and “beyond all
possible bounds of decency” to be considered extreme and outrageous. Edmondson v. Shearer
Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 180 (2003). Here, Sparkes’ IIED claim was properly dismissed
because there was no evidence the State engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that was
atrocious and beyond all bounds of decency. The officers merely performed their duties as IDFG
officers and assisted a federal agency in executing federal search warrants. The claim was also
properly dismissed because Sparkes presented no evidence of a causal connection between the
officers’ actions and his alleged injury. Fratzke v. Sanders County, 2015 WL 4964200, at *9 (D.
Mont. 2015) (it was “absolutely unforeseeable” that plaintiff would allegedly suffer emotional
distress from officer’s investigation into alleged game violations and application and execution
of search warrant – to find “otherwise could hamstring the efforts of game wardens, police
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officers, and anyone else whose duty necessarily entails looking into the lives and activities of
others”; officer was simply performing his job). Finally, the claim was properly dismissed
because Sparkes presented no evidence that he suffered severe emotional distress.
e. Conversion.
Sparkes’ conversion claim was based upon the alleged unlawful seizure and retention of
his property. A claim for conversion requires proof of three elements: “(1) that the charged party
wrongfully gained dominion of property; (2) that property is owned or possessed by plaintiff at
the time of possession; and (3) the property in question is personal property.” Med. Recovery
Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 400 (2014). Here, the
officers did not wrongfully gain dominion of Sparkes’ property. Sparkes’ property was seized
pursuant to facially valid federal warrants. The officers also did not unlawfully retain Sparkes’
property. There is no evidence any of the officers other than Smith had possession or control of
the property after it was seized. And, even with respect to Smith, there was no evidence he had
authority to release the property to Sparkes. Moreover, Sparkes presented no evidence that he
made a demand for return of his property that was refused, let alone that he made a demand on
any of the officers that was refused. The undisputed evidence showed that IDFG returned
Sparkes’ property after the county prosecutor declined to prosecute.
f. Tortious Interference with Economic Expectancy.
Sparkes contends the State allegedly improperly interfered with his economic expectation
or advantage.

To establish such a claim, Sparkes was required to show:

(1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing

– 45 –

termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure
beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff
whose expectancy has been disrupted.
. . . To establish that the intentional interference resulting in injury was wrongful,
[plaintiff] may offer proof that either: “(1) the defendant had an improper
objective or purpose to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful
means to cause injury to the prospective business relationship.” . . .
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893 (2010).
Here, Sparkes did not have a valid economic expectancy. Sparkes did not even have the
license required to offer commercial outfitting and guiding services in Idaho. The State also did
not act wrongfully. There is nothing wrongful about law enforcement officers investigating
possible law violations and assisting in the execution of search warrants. There is no evidence
any of the officers had an improper objective, intended to harm Sparkes, or used any wrongful
means to injure Sparkes’ prospective business relationships. Again, Sparkes failed to identify
what conduct of each particular officer allegedly supported his sweeping, conclusory allegations.
The numerous declarations submitted by Sparkes stated only that unknown IDFG officers
conducted a further investigation and contacted various “affiliates” of Sparkes. There is no
evidence any of the declarants were clients or potential clients of Sparkes or that they ceased
doing business with Sparkes as a result of the unidentified IDFG officers’ alleged conduct.
B.

Leave to Amend Was Properly Denied.
The district court did not err in declining to grant leave to amend the Complaint. I.R.C.P.

15(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to amend his complaint after a responsive pleading is served only
upon obtaining leave of court or consent from the adverse party. I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2). “A court
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may consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a valid claim in
determining whether to grant leave to amend the complaint.” Windom v. State, 162 Idaho 417,
421 (2017). Leave to amend should be denied when the proposed amendment would be futile.
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 847 (2010). A proposed amendment is futile when the
claim sought to be included would be disposed of on a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment. Id. “It is within the discretion of a trial court to deny a motion to amend the
pleadings.” E. Idaho Econ. Dev. Council, 139 Idaho at 497. A district court’s denial of leave to
amend is therefore reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id.
Here, the district court acted within its discretion by denying Sparkes leave to amend his
Complaint. The district court concluded that the proposed Amended Complaint failed to comply
with I.R.C.P. 9(b), which requires claims for alleged violations of civil or constitutional rights to
be pled with particularity. I.R.C.P. 9(b). The court recognized that Sparkes’ proposed Amended
Complaint, and even his summary judgment evidence, did not identify “what defendants did
what actions.” (Tr., 3/24/17, p. 20 ll. 21-23.) The court then concluded that neither “the
complaint nor the proposed amended complaint was pled with particularity in this instance. The
Court could not delineate what it is that these individual defendants are accused of doing that
violate the civil rights of Mr. Sparkes.” Id. at p. 21 ll. 7-12. By that point in time, Sparkes had
acknowledged that the federal civil rights claims against the officers in their individual capacities
were the only potentially viable claims. Id. at p. 7 ll. 11-13 & p. 15 ll. 9-10. Those proposed
claims were not adequately plead in either the Complaint or the proposed Amended Complaint as
neither pleading “state[d] with particularity the circumstances constituting . . . the violation of
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civil or constitutional rights.” Id. at p. 21 ll. 3-5. The claims in the proposed Amended
Complaint were also futile for the various reasons explained herein. Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sparkes’ leave to amend. E. Idaho Econ. Dev.
Council, 139 Idaho at 497 (summary judgment was proper where pleadings and affidavits failed
to satisfy particularity requirement of Rule 9(b)); MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 669, 671 (Ct.
App. 1995) (similar); Chambers v. Thomas, 123 Idaho 69, 74 (1992) (“If the amended pleading
does not set out a valid claim . . . it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the
motion to file the amended complaint.”).
C.

Attorney Fees.
I.C. § 12-117 provides in relevant part:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person . . . the court hearing
the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
(2) If a party to a proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and . . . the court
hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the
case, it shall award the partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case
on which it prevailed.

In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision
of section[] . . . 1983 . . . of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . .”
Here, Sparkes’ appeal of the dismissal of at least some, if not all, of his claims was

– 48 –

without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Sparkes is appealing the dismissal of claims his legal
counsel conceded were not viable. (Tr., 3/24/17, p. 7 ll. 11-13 & p. 15 ll. 9-10.) Sparkes is also
appealing the dismissal of claims against IDFG, the Board, and the officers in their official
capacities that Sparkes himself acknowledges lack merit.

(App.’s Op. Br. 2 & 17

(acknowledging the “State of Idaho cannot be sued as a government actor” but identifying one of
the issues on appeal as whether the district court erred in “finding that the Defendants are not
persons as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore not amenable to suit”). Sparkes’
legal counsel also admitted that it is “well established case law” that the § 1983 claims against
IDFG, the Board, and their officers in their official capacities are not viable and that the state law
claims were “out.” (Tr., 3/24/17, p. 7 ll. 11-14 & p. 15 ll. 8-10.) Moreover, Sparkes himself
admitted that “revelations in discovery” justified dismissing Wadley, the Board, Stanley,
Klucken, Marek and Howe as defendants.

(App.’s Op. Br. 18.)

Sparkes’ own proposed

Amended Complaint would have dismissed the § 1983 search and seizure, malicious
prosecution, and failure to train claims. (R. Vol. 5 pp. 1013-1022.) Sparkes is nonetheless
appealing the dismissal of those claims as to all defendants. Sparkes’ appeal of these conceded
and “well established” issues was without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Accordingly, the
State should be awarded attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Judgment for Dismissal With
Prejudice in favor of the State on all of Sparkes’ claims.
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DATED this 28th day of November, 2017.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By___________/s/____________________
BENTLEY G. STROMBERG
Attorneys for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of November, 2017, I caused to be served two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing by U.S. Mail addressed to the following:
Michael J. Sparkes, pro se
P.O. Box 543
Chattaroy, WA 99003
___________/s/______________________________
BENTLEY G. STROMBERG
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